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The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has a long and
checkered history. In this article the author traces the development of the
right to be free of compelled Incrimination, the current state of the law Is
summarized and the Wyoming trend Is examined.

SILENCE IS NO LONGER

GOLDEN: DESTRUCTION OF THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Sylvia Lee Hackl*
No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself....'
For many years, the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
was held to guarantee "the right of a person to remain silent unless he
(chose] to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty... for such silence." 2 The practical effect of this interpretation
was to prohibit prosecutorial comment on a defendant's pre-trial silence.
After all, the privilege against self-incrimination reflects an
essential theme of our accusatorial system: the state cannot force
the accused to participate in his own self-condemnation by compelling him to disclose incriminating testimonial evidence. How else
can a criminal suspect exercise this right except by remaining
silent?s
In recent years, however, many decisions at both the federal and state level
have eroded the once sacrosanct protections of the fifth amendment, to the
extent that silence is no longer golden. This article will summarize the
history of the right and outline the current trend diluting that right.
Appellate Counsel, Wyoming State Public Defender Program; J.D. 1980, University of
Wyoming College of Law; B.A. 1977, Lewis & Clark College. The views expressed here
are the author's alone; they do not represent the views of the Wyoming State Public
Defender Program or the Wyoming State Government.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
3. Amela, "Right" to Silence Diluted by Burger Court, NAT'L. L. J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 30,
col. 1.
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THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: ESTABLISHMENT AND
DESTRUCTION BY THE FEDERAL COURTS

In 1957, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
overturned a defendant's conviction because he had been questioned about
his exercise of his right to remain silent when appearing before a grand
jury. 4 Four years later, a majority of the Court again reversed a conviction
because of improper prosecutorial comment on an accused's assertion of
his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.' In Stewart v. United
States, the defendant had been tried three times for murder. He first took
the stand in his own defense during the third trial, at which time the pro,
secutor asked: " 'This is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn't it,
Willie?' " The Supreme Court held that any comment or argument about
the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege was prohibited and
constituted 7prejudicial error which could not be cured by cautionary
instructions.
A similar situation faced the Court in Griffin v. California."The Court
again barred comment on an accused's exercise of rights guaranteed by the
fifth amendment. Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas noted that such
comment was a "remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal
justice,' "9 and constituted a "penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege." 10
Another important step in the establishment of the right was the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona," in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the fifth amendment created an affirmative duty to warn
suspects of their "right to remain silent" prior to custodial interrogation.
The Court also issued a stern warning to prosecutors: "it is impermissible
to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not,
therefore, use at trial the12fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in
the face of accusation.'
The probative value of evidence of an accused's silence at the time of
his arrest was discussed at length in United States v. Hale.'5 When the
defendant took the stand in that case, the prosecutor cross-examined him
about his failure to offer exculpatory information to the police at the time
of his arrest. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the impermissible comment on the defendant's pre-trial silence irreparably prejudiced his defense and infringed on his constitutional right to
remain silent. 14 In affirming the circuit court's reversal of the defendant's
4. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
5. Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
6. Id. at 4. In fact, the prosecutor asked the question twice. Id. at 4 n.7.
7. Id. at 2, 9.
8. 380 U.S. 609 (1965), reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
9. Id. at 614 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
10. Id. at 614.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Id. at 468 n.37.
13. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
14. United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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conviction, the Supreme Court commented on the ambiguous and therefore
non-probative nature of silence, and noted the particularly difficult situation in which an arrestee was placed.
[H]e is under no duty to speak and ...has ordinarily been advised
by government authorities only moments earlier that he had a right
to remain silent, and that anything he does say can and will be used
against him in court.
At the time of arrest and during custodial interrogation, innocent and guilty alike-perhaps particularly the innocent-may find
the situation so intimidating that they may choose to stand mute. A
variety of reasons may influence that decision. In these often emotional and confusing circumstances, a suspect may not have heard
or fully understood the question, or may have felt there was no
need to reply. He may have maintained silence out of fear or unwillingness to incriminate another. Or the arrestee may simply react
with silence in response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his detention. In sum, the inherent
pressures of in-custody interrogation..,
compound the difficulty of
5
identifying the reason for silence.'
The Court concluded its opinion with a discussion of the dangers of using evidence of pre-trial silence. The Court noted that such silence was not
probative and also carried with it a significant potential for prejudice. The
prejudice arose from the danger that a jury would16misinterpret such silence
and give it far more credence than appropriate.
The Court decided the case on evidentiary grounds, ruling that the probative value of the pre-trial silence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. By deciding the case in this manner, the Court avoided a discussion of
the constitutional issue upon which the circuit court had partially based its
decision, that being the question of whether the use of such silence violated
the defendant's right to remain silent. A year later, however, the constitutional question was squarely before the Court in Doyle v. Ohio.'" The issue
was whether a prosecutor could "impeach a defendant's exculpatory story,
told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his
failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time
of his arrest.""' The Court held that such use of a defendant's post-arrest
silence violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 9
The Court's holding in Doyle appeared to settle the issue of comment
on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. In fact, however, the
Court's ruling did not constitute an absolute ban on the in-court use of such
silence. First of all, in its holding, the Court focused on the use of silence
which had occurred after both arrest and the giving of Miranda warnings.
Second, the Court recognized at least one exception to the ban in the form
15. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1975) (citations omitted).

16. Id. at 180.
17. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
18. Id. at 611.
19. Id. at 619.
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of impeachment of a defendant who gave exculpatory testimony at trial
and claimed to have told the same version to the arresting officers. 20 Finally, the Court left open the question of whether such an error could ever be
harmless.21
Some of the ambiguities remaining after Doyle were clarified four
years later by the Court's decision in Jenkinsv.Anderson.22 The Court held
that neither the fifth nor the fourteenth amendment was violated by the
use of an accused's prearrest silence to impeach his credibility. 23
In deciding that no basic constitutional principles were prejudiced by
such use of prearrest silence, the Court engaged in a rather tortured
analysis of its previous decisions concerning prearrest silence. The Court
construed its decisions in Grrunewaldv. United States,2 4 Stewart v. United
States,25 and United States v. Hale26 as mere exercises of its supervisory
power over federal courts in evidentiary matters.2 7 The Court interpreted
those decisions as nothing more than evidentiary rulings that a defendant's
prior silence could not be used for impeachment where its probative value
was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.2 8 The majority decision emphasized the need for impeachment of a defendant, including the use of his prearrest silence, to enhance the reliability of the criminal process, and
to take the stand as a voluntary
characterized the defendant's 'decision
29
waiver of "his cloak of silence.
Only one earlier case was distinguished from the factual situation in
Jenkins, that being the 1976 case of Doyle v. Ohio.30 The Jenkins Court
distinguished Doyle on the ground that the defendant in that case had been
induced to remain silent by the giving of Miranda warnings. The Jenkins
Court deemed it fundamentally unfair for the government to assure the accused that he had a right to remain silent and then to use that silence
against him.81 Absent such governmental inducement to remain silent,
rights to
however, it was neither unfair nor violative of basic constitutional
32
impeach a defendant by use of his prearrest silence.
The majority's holding, as well as the analysis it employed in reaching
that decision, met with severe criticism, not the least of which stemmed
from within the Court itself. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from
the Court's holding, and found three major flaws in the Court's reasoning:
Today the Court holds that a criminal defendant's testimony in
his own behalf may be impeached by the fact that he did not go to
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 619 n.11.
Id. at 619-20.
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Id. at 232, 238, 240-241.
353 U.S. 391 (1957).
366 U.S. 1 (1961).
422 U.S. 171 (1975).
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 238.
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-240.
Id. at 240.
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the authorities before his arrest and confess his part in the offense.
The decision thus strikes a blow at two of the foundation stones of
our constitutional system: the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to present a defense.
The Court's holding that a criminal defendant's testimony may
be impeached by his prearrest silence has three patent-and, in my
view, fatal-defects. First, the mere fact of prearrest silence is so
unlikely to be probative of the falsity of the defendant's trial
testimony that its use for impeachment purposes is contrary to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the
drawing of an adverse inference from the failure to volunteer incriminating statements impermissibly infringes the privilege
against self-incrimination. Third, the availability of the inference
for impeachment purposes impermissibly burdens the decision to
exercise the constitutional right to testify in one's own defense.38
As noted by the dissent, the major analytical flaw in the majority's
reasoning was its failure to recognize that its ruling compelled an individual who had not yet been arrested to incriminate himself by coming
forward and admitting his knowledge of or participation in an offense, in
order to avoid being impeached by his failure to do so. In effect, this aspect
of the Jenkins decision irreparably prejudices the principal policy inherent
in the fifth
amendment: an accused cannot be compelled to incriminate
4
himself.8
Another problem with the Jenkins decision was the Court's undue emphasis on governmental inducement of the right to remain silent-that is,
that the giving of the Miranda warnings was a necessary prerequisite to the
successful invocation of the right.83 This emphasis "elevated the warning
from a prophylactic means of '36
protecting the fifth amendment to an independent source of the right.
Six days after the decision in Jenkins, the Court elaborated on yet
another of the ambiguities in the Doyle case, that dealing with the use of
prior inconsistent statements for purposes of impeachment.8 7 In Anderson
v. Charles, 8 the Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that it did not violate
due process to cross-examine the defendant about inconsistencies between
his post-arrest statements to the police and his in-court testimony. The objectionable question in Anderson was: "Don't you think it's rather odd that
if it were the truth that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the
time you were arrested, where you got the car?" 9 The Sixth Circuit Court
33. Id. at 245-46.
34. Note, Impeachment of a Criminal Defendant by Reference to His PrearrestSilence
Violates NeitherHis Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-IncriminationNor His FourteenthAmendment GuaranteeofDue Process,49 U. CiNN. L. REV. 857,863-66 (1980); See
also Arnella, supra note 3.
35. 447 U.S. at 240-41.
36. Note, supra note 34, at 866. This emphasis was foreshadowed by dicta in the Court's decision two months before Jenkins, in Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
37. See supra text accompanying note 20.
38. 447 U.S. 404 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980).
39. Id. at 406.
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of Appeals had held that this line of questioning violated due process under
the principles enunciated in Doyle v.Ohio.40 The Supreme Court disagreed
with the circuit court's reasoning, 41 and distinguished the Doyle case on the
ground that decision only barred the in-court use of a defendant's postarrest silence, and did not "apply to cross-examination that merely inquires
into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of
silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent." 42
While the brief decision in Anderson v. Chartes initially seemed to be no
more than a reassertion of the basic principles underlying impeachment by
prior inconsistent statements, in fact it drew still finer distinctions between
permissible and impermissible comment on a defendant's exercise of his
right to remain silent; in Anderson v. Charles, this distinction was between
complete and partial post-arrest silence. 4 8 Such distinctions, coupled with
the Court's insistence that Miranda warnings must be given before a defendant may successfully assert his right to remain silent, 44 ignore the very
spirit of the protections embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Those constitutional provisions guarantee that a defendant cannot be compelled to incriminate himself, and the policy underlying that guarantee is
that the government will not use unfair methods in obtaining a conviction.
Yet the fine-line distinctions drawn by the Court in Jenkins and Anderson
v. Charles impinge on these constitutional concepts by requiring a defendant to have technical knowledge of developing distinctions in the law in
order to know precisely when and under what circumstances he can safely
assert his right to remain silent.
The Court again reiterated its reliance in the formality of Miranda
warnings as a prerequisite to protecting constitutional rights in Fletcherv.
Weir.4' In yet another per curiam decision, the Court held that, absent "the
sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings," due
process was not violated by cross-examining a defendant concerning his
post-arrest silence.4 6 The Court's reliance on the Miranda warnings as a
necessary prerequisite to activating the right to remain silent not only
places undue emphasis on those warnings as an independent source of the
right,4T but also ignores the Court's own analysis as expressed in United
States v. Hale concerning the many reasons underlying post-arrest
silence,' 8 which reasons are equally applicable whether or not Miranda
warnings have been given. 49 An arrestee-whether guilty or innocent-may remain silent because of fear, misunderstanding, intimidation, confusion or a multitude of other emotional responses to an unfamiliar
and potentially hostile situation. 50 The formality of Miranda warnings
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Charles v. Anderson, 610 F.2d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 1979).
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407.
Id. at 408.
Note, ProtectingDoyle Rights after Anderson v. Charles:The Problem of PartialSilence,
69 VA. L. REV. 155 (1983).
See supra text at note 36.
455 U.S. 603 (1982). (Per curiam).
Id. at 607.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
422 U.S. 171, 176-177 (1975).
Cf.Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 242-43 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
422 U.S. at 177.
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would have little effect in exacerbating or ameliorating these emotions; if
anything, those emotions are stronger before the warnings are given, thus
making pre-Miranda silence even less probative than post-Miranda silence.
The Court's decision in Fletcher perpetuated the need for a
sophisticated knowledge of the law on an arrestee's part, and also encouraged law enforcement officers to delay giving the required warnings"'
in direct contravention of the very principles underlying the prophylactic
rule of Miranda itself.
The final emasculation of the principles enunciated in Doyle v. Ohio occurred in the federal system at the circuit court level. As mentioned earlier,
in Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme Court did not address the question of
whether impermissible comment on the right to remain silent could constitute harmless error. 52 Although the Court has not resolved this question
itself,5 3 various circuit courts have held that such error can in fact be
harmless. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was one of the first to discuss
this issue. In Chapman v. United States,54 the court established three
categories for analyzing whether an improper comment on a defendant's
silence constituted reversible or harmless error:
[1] When the prosecution uses defendant's post-arrest silence to
impeach an exculpatory story offered by defendant at trial and the
prosecution directly links the implausibility of the exculpatory
story to the defendant's ostensibly inconsistent act of remaining
silent, reversible error results even if the story is transparently
frivolous.
[2] When the prosecutor does not directly tie the fact of
defendant's silence to his exculpatory story, i.e., when the prosecutor elicits that fact on direct examination and refrains from
commenting on it or adverting to it again, and the jury is never told
that such silence can be used for impeachment purposes, reversible
error results if the exculpatory story is not totally implausible or
the indicia of guilt not overwhelming.
[3] When there is but a single reference at trial to the fact of defendant's silence, the reference is neither repeated nor linked with
defendant's exculpatory story, and the exculpatory story is
transparently frivolous and evidence of guilt is otherwise overwhelming, the reference to defendant's silence constitutes
harmless error. 65
Even while holding that such error could, under the proper circumstances,
be deemed harmless, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless indicated an extreme
reluctance to permit such improper comment. In Chapman v. United
States, the Fifth Circuit issued a strong admonition against wholesale adoption of the harmless error rule: "The infusion of 'harmlessness' into error
51. Amelia, supra note 3.
52. 426 U.S. at 619-20.
53. But see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh'g denied, 286 U.S. 987 (1967).
54. 547 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
55. United States v. Ylda, 643 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Chapman v. United
States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1977)).
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must be the exception, and the doctrine must be sparingly employed. A
miniscule error must coalesce with gargantuan guilt, even where the accused displays an imagination of Pantagruelian dimensions."56 And in United
States v. Edwards, the same court again noted that "comment upon silence
of the accused is a crooked knife and one likely to turn in the prosecutor's
hand. The circumstances under which it will not occasion a reversal are few
and discrete.""
Recently, the categories established in Chapman v. United States for
analyzing the harmlessness of the error have fallen into disuse, and a caseby-case analysis has emerged. 8 The focus is on such factors as whether the
reference was made or elicited by the prosecution, 9 whether the prosecution unduly emphasized the reference, 0° whether the comment went to the
heart of the defense, 61 and whether there was substantial evidence of
guilt.62 This type of analysis is equally unsatisfactory, since it dilutes the
previous emphasis on the improper nature of the comments themselves and
encourages such comments in the hope that the error will be shrugged off
as harmless, and the conviction upheld.
The lower federal courts have also followed the United States Supreme
Court's lead in drawing fine-line distinctions between permissible and improper comment on an accused's pre-trial silence. Some courts have required Miranda warnings as a necessary prerequisite to protecting a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent, 63 and others6 4have used a "partial silence" rationale in line with Anderson v. Charles.
Doyle v. Ohio represented the apex in the history of protections offered
to an individual when exercising his constitutional right to remain silent.
Since then, those protections have been continually eroded. There are now
four divisions of the "right," depending upon when the accused remains
silent and in what context the comment thereon occurs. The first division is
that of prearrest silence; comment upon such silence is permissible.6 5 The
next category is post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence; once again, comment
upon silence during this period of time has been deemed acceptable. 66 Postarrest, post-Miranda silence is the third division. If a defendant remains
silent after he has been arrested and after he has been read his rights, his
silence may not be used against him, unless the fourth category-that of
56.
57.
58.
59.

547 F.2d at 1250. See also United States v. Ylda, 643 F.2d at 351.
576 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1978).
United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 383 (5th Cir. 1983).
United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978); United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).
60. United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156,1162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978); United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
906 (1977); United States v. Dixon, 593 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 861 (1979).
61. United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981).
62. Sullivan v. Alabama, 666 F.2d 478, 485 (11th Cir. 1982).
63. United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).
64. United States v. Ochoa - Sanchez, 676 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel.
Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, U.S. __,
103 S.Ct.
2104 (1983).
65. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980).
66. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
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harmless error-comes into play. Obviously, today's defendant must have a
thorough understanding of the law and split-second timing in order to
clothe himself with the protections once thought to be automatically provided by the Constitution.
B.

FOLLOWING THE FEDERAL COURTS: DILUTION OF THE

RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IN STATE COURTS

1. In general
Many state courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in analyzing
when and how a defendant remains silent, with the result that the right to
remain silent has been diluted at the state court level as well. For example,
many state courts have either adopted or explicitly acknowledged the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins v. Anderson permitting
comment upon an accused's pre-arrest silence. 67 Similarly, many courts
now permit comment upon an accused's post-arrest silence which precedes
the giving of Miranda warnings; 68 the rationale expressed in the concurring
opinion in Jenkins v. Anderson has struck a responsive chord in some state
appellate courts.6 9 In these state court cases, as with their federal court
predecessors, the insistence that a formal warning be given before a defendant may assert his right to silence with impunity has a major analytical
flaw. The reasoning underlying these decisions indicates that a defendant
has a right to rely only on Mirandawarnings given by an arresting officer
and not upon any other source, be it the advice of counsel, the comments of
a presiding judge, or his own knowledge of the existence of that constitutional guarantee. Some judges have in fact disagreed with their courts' approval of the Jenkins rationale. In State v. Nott 70 for example, Judge
Prager stated:
In my judgment, the opinion of the majority has charted a
course for the courts of Kansas which not only violates constitutional principles but is contrary to express provisions of the Kansas
statutes. The effect of the majority opinion will be to seriously impair, if not to destroy, the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination 71as provided for in the federal and Kansas
Constitutions.

67. Bloomstrand v. State, 656 P.2d 584,587 (Alaska App. 1982); State v. Villarreal, 126 Ariz.
589, 617 P.2d 541, 542 (1980); Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518, 523 (Ga. 1982); State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 665 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1983); People v. Eliason, 453 N.E.2d 908,917
(Ill. App. 1983); Abdullah v. State, 49 Md. App. 141, 430 A.2d 119, 121 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nicherson, 386 Mass. 54, 434 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1982); State v. Callahan,
310 N.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Minn. 1981); State v. Helgeson, 303 N.W.2d 342, 347-48 (N.D.
1981); State v. Sims, 3 Ohio App. 3d 331, 445 N.E.2d 245,248 n.6 (1982); Smith v. State,
656 P.2d 277, 282-83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
68. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 610-11 (Colo. 1983); Phillips v. State, 164 Ga. App. 235,
299 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1983); Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518, 523 (Ga. 1982); State v. Urart, 105 Idaho 92, 665 P.2d 1104 (1983); People v. Ellason, 453 N.E. 2d 908, 917 (Ill.
pp. 1983); Sanchez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tx. App. 1982).
69. State v. Callahan, 310 N.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Minn. 1981); State v. Helgeson, 303 N.W.2d
342, 347-48 (N.D. 1981).
70. 669 P.2d 660 (Kan. 1983).
71. Id. at 676.
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The majority opinion, if followed by the courts of Kansas, will
have the effect of bringing about the depreciation, if not destruction, of a basic constitutional right. If a person's assertion of his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at the direction of his
court-appointed attorney, or as a result of the admonition of a trial
judge, can later be used by the prosecutor for impeachment during
cross-examination at his trial, that assertion has become "costly,"
and the State has penalized that person for his exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. The effect of the majority decision is
essentially this: A person charged with a crime has a constitutional
and statutory right to remain silent, but, if he exercises that right
and remains silent, his silence can later be used to impeach his
credibility if he ever takes the stand in his defense thereafter. Does
not such a rule impose a sanction or penalty on the exercise of a
constitutional right? As stated by Justice Black in his concurring
opinion in Grunewald:
"It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible for
courts which exist and act only under the Constitution to
draw inferences of lack of honesty from invocation of a
privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement in the Constitution."72
The issue of the use of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence has not been
the subject of great debate at the state court level, except insofar as the
question of harmless error is involved. The harmless error concept has been
embraced by state courts, and, judging 73by the cases on appeal, the standard
seems to favor application of the rule.
Despite the apparent diminution of the right to remain silent at the
state court level, several appellate courts continue to adhere to strict constitutional principles. The Florida and Pennsylvania courts, for example,
have refused to permit distinctions between silence which precedes the giving of Miranda warnings and that which follows it. In Lee v. State7' the
Florida appellate court held that it was "impermissible to comment on a
defendant's post-arrest silence whether or not the silence [was] induced by
Miranda warnings. ' 75 The court reasoned that while the giving of Miranda
warnings made it particularly unfair to use a person's silence against him,
there was no valid reason to distinguish between pre- and post-Miranda
silence:
[W]hile Miranda warnings make it even more offensive to use a
person's silence upon arrest against him, the absence of such warnings does not add to nor detract from an individual's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. If one has a right upon arrest not to
speak for fear of self-incrimination, then the mere fact that the
72. Id. at 684 (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425-426 (Black, J., concurring)). (Emphasis in original).
73. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 610-11 (Coo. 1983); Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518, 523
(Ga. 1982); State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 665 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1983); State v.
Callahan, 310 N.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Minn. 1981); State v. Borotz, 654 S.W.2d 111, 114
(Mo. App. 1983); State v. Mosher, 465 A.2d 261, 267-68 (Vt. 1983).
74. 442 So.2d 928 (Fla. App. 1982).
75. Id. at 931.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss2/11

10

Hackl: The Right to Silence Is No Longer Golden: Destruction of the Righ
1984

DESTRUCTION OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

police call his attention to that right does not elevate it to any
higher level. If it were otherwise, an ignorant defendant who was
advised of his right to remain silent would be protected against use
of his silence to impeach him at trial; but an educated, sophisticated
defendant familiar with his right to remain silent who was not apprised of that right by the police would be subject to impeachment
76
for the exercise of a known constitutionally protected right.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania used a similar analysis in Commonwealth v. Turner.7 The court recognized the "strong disposition on the
part of lay jurors to view the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege as
an admission of guilt," 78 regardless of when or how that privilege was
asserted. The court then noted that it was inappropriate to protect an accused's right to remain silent only when that silence was preceded by the
giving of Miranda warnings-in other words, ' "where
there is a governmen79
tal inducement of the exercise of the right.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals continues to reject attempts
to distinguish between pre- and post-arrest silence, and simply forbids comment on an accused's pretrial silence.80 In a similar vein, the Supreme
Court of Utah still deems comment on a defendant's post-arrest, postMiranda silence to be fundamental error.8 1 The Massachusetts court, in
contrast, has considered the harmless error rule, but deems Doyle
error to
82
be "so egregious that reversal is the norm, not the exception."
2. The Trend in Wyoming
The Wyoming Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case." 83 The right against
self-incrimination has long been recognized and guarded by the courts of
this state. Even before the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Doyle, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, in reversing an aggravated assault conviction, that "[no] constitutional right of an accused
person is more sacred than his right not to make a statement or testify
against himself, and it [is] highly improper for any comment or question to
be made or asked pertaining thereto." 8 4 The concurring opinion in that
same case referred to the "chilling effect" of such comment, and noted that
"[a] constitutional guaranty indeed becomes barren and valueless if by the
assertion thereof it can be utilized to [an accused's] detriment."8 5 In yet
another case, Jerskey v. State,8 6 the Wyoming court went to great lengths
to examine the philosophies underlying the fifth amendment and correlative state constitutional provisions, and to underscore the need to protect the precious rights afforded thereby.87
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 930 (quoting Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. App. 1977)).
454 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1982).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 540.
Dungan v. State, 651 P.2d 1064 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Harris v. State, 645 P.2d 1036
(Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981).
Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 448 N.E.2d 704, 715 (1983).
Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534, 538 (Wyo. 1973).
Id. at 539-40 (Guthrie, J.,
concurring).
546 P.2d 173 (Wyo. 1976).
Id. at 174-78.
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In Jerskey, a package mailed to the appellant containing seven kilos of
marijuana had been intercepted by the police, who removed some of the
marijuana before delivering the package. The appellant was then charged
with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and attempted possession.88 At trial, the two officers who had interrogated the appellant after his arrest were asked to relate the substance of their conversation. Both testified that the appellant had not responded to questions concerning the package of marijuana. Officer Roylance indicated, in response
to the prosecutor's question, "We asked something to the effect of if he had
expected more or if he had noticed anything missing and his reply to this
was no comment. "89 The other officer, Vincent Valdez, testified that "I asked him, 'You weren't planning to smoke it all by yourself?' I said, 'You
would have to be a pretty heavy smoker to do that.' And he offered no reply
to this question." 90
In deciding that this line of questioning violated the appellant's
privilege against self-incrimination, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed
the numerous cases which had discussed the fifth amendment and its
Wyoming counterpart.9 ' The court noted the importance of the privilege in
preserving "the very most basic of the individual's rights in a democratic
society, '9 2 and said that comment upon an accused's silence would not be
permitted absent a showing by the state that the accused had knowingly
and understandingly waived the privilege.93 The court then held that the
error required reversal of the conviction since the officers' testimony had
been elicited to create an inference that an honest response
by the ap94
pellant to the questions would have incriminated him.
Eleven months after the decision in Jerskey, the Wyoming Supreme
Court had an opportunity to consider the principles enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio.95 In Irvin v. State,96 the appellant had chosen to remain silent following his arrest. He presented an
alibi defense during his trial. During cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked the appellant why he had not told the police about his alibi. The prosecutor than commented at length on this failure during closing argument,
implying fabrication.9 7 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that such comment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to the principles enunciated in Doyle.98
A year later yet another case came before the Wyoming Supreme
Court with the same issue. In Clenin v. State, the appellant was charged
with delivery of a controlled substance.9 9 He turned himself in to the police,
but-acting on his lawyer's advice-did not talk with anyone. He then
88. Id. at 174.
89. Id. at 178.
90. Id. at 179.
91. Id. at 175-78.
92. Id. at 175.
93. Id. at 179.
94. Id. at 183.
95. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
96. 560 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1977).
97. Id. at 373.

98. Id.

99. 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978).
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raised an alibi defense at trial. During cross-examination, the prosecutor
questioned the appellant at length regarding his failure to tell either the officers or the county attorney about his alibi:
Q. Now after you were arrested, of course then you told the-were
you questioned at that time?
A. No, sir, I was not.
Q. And what police officers did you tell that you weren't there, that
you were at this party?
A. I did not tell the police officers a thing, sir.
Q. You didn't tell anyone?
A. On my lawyer's advice, I told no one, sir.
Q. You mean this is the first time that you have told this to anyone
besides your lawyer?
A. No, sir, this isn't the first time. When I turned myself in, sir, I did
not communicate with nobody, sir, except the lawyer who was present when I turned myself in.
Q. Well, when you were arrested though, didn't you say, look it, this
couldn't be me, I was at a party?
A. No, sir, I didn't.
Q. You didn't say that?
A. No, sir, upon my lawyer's advice.
Q. Did you ever notify my office and tell me that you wereA. No, sir. If [sic] left that up to my lawyer, sir.
Q. Did any of your witnesses, so far as you know, ever tell the police or
tell my office that you had an alibi, that you weren't there and
couldn't have done this thing that you are accused of?.100
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that this cross-examination violated
the appellant's right to remain silent under the applicable sections of the
United States and Wyoming Constitutions. 10 ' The court also announced a
rule that the violation of an accused's right to remain silent was prejudicial
per se. 02 In Clenin, the state asked the court to find such error to be
harmless, a suggestion the court rejected. The court held that the determination of the matter was not limited to a consideration of the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution, but required consideration
of the Wyoming Constitution and pertinent caselaw as well:
Historically, our Court has jealously guarded the right provided in Art. 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming
against any infringement. We hold that under this section of our
state constitution any comment upon an accused's exercise of his
right of silence, whether by interrogation of the accused himself, or
by interrogation of others inherently is prejudicial, and will entitle
an accused to reversal of his conviction. Such a breach of the
100. Id. at 845.
101. Id. at 846.

102. Id.
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accused's constitutional protections is plain error and prejudicial

per se.' 0 3

The Clenin rule lasted for less than four years. In 1982, the Wyoming
Supreme Court decided the case of Richter v. State,104 and overruled the
prejudicial per se rule, adopting a harmless error analysis instead. In
Richter, the appellant Ronald Richter and his nephew Alvin Richter had
each been charged with and convicted of first degree sexual assault, stemming from an incident alleged to have occurred near Cheyenne, Wyoming,
on July 19, 1980.10° The appellants were said to have taken a young woman
several miles south of Cheyenne where they sexually assaulted her. After
said events, Ronald Richter went to sleep alongside the road where they
had stopped, while Alvin Richter and the woman sat in the pickup truck. A
patrol car came by, and the woman called for help. Alvin Richter apparently fled the scene, but Ronald Richter was arrested when he walked up
He was immediately handcuffbehind the truck and was ordered to freeze.
10 6
ed, searched, and taken into custody.
At trial, Ronald Richter took the stand and testified in his own behalf.
He indicated that he and his nephew had met the woman at the Mayflower
Bar and she had voluntarily left with them. He also testified that the subsequent events-including the sexual relations-had been consensual.107 During cross-examination, the prosecutor grilled Ronald Richter on his story.
At one point, the prosecutor asked, "Did you volunteer this version to the
deputies at that time when you walked behind the truck?" Appellant's
counsel immediately moved for a mistrial on the ground that the question
constituted an impermissible comment on Ronald Richter's right to remain
of the
silent. Although the trial court acknowledged the improper nature
inquiry and reprimanded the prosecutor, it denied the motion. 10 8
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the many cases
which had discussed the issue of comment on the right to remain silent and
acknowledged the impropriety of such comments in general. 10 9 The court
then focused on the propriety of the trial court's refusal to grant the
and
mistrial, rather than on the nature of the improper comment itself,
concluded that the Clenin prejudicial-per-se rule was too broad. 110
The prejudicial-per-se approach should not be allowed to prohibit an affirmance of a criminal conviction in cases where the error was clearly harmless. Such a rule exacts too high a toll of the
legal system to be sustainable....

103. Id.
104. 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982). The appellants in this case were represented by the office of
the Wyoming Public Defender throughout trial and on appeal. The author of this article
prepared the brief and argued the case on appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
105. Id. at 1270.
106. Id. at 1271-72.
107. Id. at 1272.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1273-74.
110. Id. at 1274.
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...Where there was but one comment at trial to the fact of defendant's silence, even though the comment was ambiguous and the
evidence of guilt overwhelming, it makes no sense to reverse a conviction. The expense to the State is substantial, not only in
monetary terms, but also on terms of the amount of confidence
members of society possess in the system's ability to dole out
justice and protect the law-abiding citizenry. The constitutional
right to silence must and should be jealously guarded; but, it is selfdefeating to refuse to recognize error as harmless when it is."'
and overruled the
The court affirmed Ronald Richter's conviction,
112
Clenin rule, adopting a harmless error analysis.
The court's sudden overruling of its own precedent did not pass
without comment from within the court itself. Justice Thomas concurred in
the result, but thought the abandonment of the prejudicial per se rule to be
unwise. 1 3 He suggested that the matter would have been better decided
under a Jenkins v. Anderson analysis focusing on the pre-arrest nature of
the silence." 1 4 Chief Justice Rose also dissented from the majority's ruling
regarding the harmless error doctrine, finding it contrary to the development under Wyoming law of the right to remain silent."15 He thought the
adoption of the harmless error rule would tempt prosecutors to test the
limits of the court's tolerance for what was truly harmless-a concern
shared by Justice Thomas." 16
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Richter is troublesome not
only because the court so readily overruled its own recent decision, but also
because the basis upon which it adopted the harmless error rule and its application of that rule to the facts of the case were questionable. In its opinion, the court indicated that the harmless error rule had been adopted by
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions," 7 a statement with which the
appellant took exception in the petition for rehearing filed shortly after the
court handed down its decision. The court also expressed concern that to do
other than adopt the harmless error rule would undermine public faith in
our system of justice."18 Yet "the system's ability to dole out justice and
protect the law-abiding citizenry" 1 9 depends upon consistency in enforcing
those basic constitutional guarantees which extend to all citizens and provide the underpinnings for our democratic society.'20
In addition, in Richter the court did not wed the harmless error exception to the facts of the case.12' Despite the majority's characterization of
the improper comment as ambiguous and the evidence of guilt as over111. Id. at 1274, 1275.
112. Id. at 1275-76.
113. Id. at 1278-79 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 1277 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1281-85 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1279, 1286.
117. Id. at 1274-75.
118. Id. at 1275.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 175 (Wyo. 1976).
121. 642 P.2d at 1279 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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whelming,112 in fact the appellant's story was plausible and the evidence
controverted.123 Given the nature of the accused's story, the error should
2 4
Certainly a minor error did not
not have been deemed harmless.1
"coalesce with gargantuan guilt"'' 25 so as to justify application of the
harmless error doctrine.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Richter v. State raises
several questions. The first is whether comment on pre-arrest silence will
be permitted. Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Richter seems to indicate an affirmative answer to this inquiry. 2 6 It would be a mistake for the
court to permit such inquiry, however, since pre-arrest silence is not proan individual for not stepbative and comment upon such silence penalizes
27
ping forward and incriminating himself.
The second question remaining after Richter is whether the Wyoming
Supreme Court will require formal Miranda warnings as a prerequisite to
protection of the right to remain silent. Although the issue was not discussed in Richter, dicta in Clenin v. State'2 8 indicates that the court may not require formal warnings. In Clenin, Justice Thomas commented that the
right to remain silent, guaranteed by article 1, section 2 of the Wyoming
Constitution,
does not depend upon [an accused] being advised of that right, but
exists by virtue of the constitutional language. Advice as to that
right ... is only for the purpose of expanding its protection by
assuring that the accused person is aware of it. 129
Since this aspect of the Clenin case was not overruled by the subsequent
decision in Richter,130 it remains valid, and the court would be well-advised
to adhere to that concept.
The final question left unanswered by Richter concerns the limits of the
harmless error rule adopted by the court. The standard enunciated in
Richter was vague; the court referred to an "ambiguous" comment and
"overwhelming" evidence of guilt in deciding that it made "no sense to
reverse [the] conviction."' 3 ' This is at best a subjective guideline, one which
will too easily tempt the prosecution to test its limits in hopes of securing a
conviction.13 2 To avoid this problem, the court should define the scope of
122. Id. at 1275.
123. See eupra text accompanying notes 106-107.
124. Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977):
When the prosecutor does not directly tie the fact of defendant's silence to
his exculpatory story, i.e., when the prosecutor elicits that fact on direct examination and refrains from commenting on it or adverting to it again, and the
jury is never told that such silence can be used for impeachment purposes,
reversible error results if the exculpatory story is not totally implausible or the
indicia of guilt not overwhelming.
125. Id. at 1250.
126. 642 P.2d at 1278 (Thomas, J., concurring).
127. See supra text accompanying note 33.
128. 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978).
129. Id. at 846.
130. See 642 P.2d at 1273, 1274, 1276 (Wyo. 1982).
131. Id. at 1275.
132. Id. at 1286 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
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harmless error in this context and if it is serious about protecting the right
to silence, should clearly announce that impermissible comment on the
right to remain silent is "so egregious that reversal is the norm, not the
exception." 1 83
In many respects, the Richter case is a turning point for the Wyoming
Supreme Court. The next case which raises a right to silence issue will
determine whether and to what extent our court will follow the example of
the United States Supreme Court and other federal and state courts in
diluting the right to remain silent.
C. CONCLUSION

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and correlative
sections of state constitutions guarantee to an accused a right against selfincrimination. The interpretation of this right has come to include a right to
remain silent. For many years, it was deemed improper for the prosecution
to use against an accused the fact that he exercised that right. A series of
cases established this rule and discussed the reasons underlying it. In recent years, however, courts throughout the federal and state systems have
begun chipping away at the right to remain silent, first by permitting comment upon an individual's silence prior to arrest, then by allowing the use
of silence which follows arrest but precedes the giving of formal Miranda
warnings, and finally, by deeming some comment upon post-arrest, postMiranda silence to be harmless. This steady erosion of the right to remain
silent has rendered the right a mere pebble compared to the solid rock of a
constitutional shield that it once was. No longer does "[tihe constitutional
right to 1remain silent.., compel the State to remain silent about such
silence." 34

133. Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 448 N.E.2d 704, 715 (1983) (emphasis supplied).
184. State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710, 716 (W. Va. App. 1977).
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